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I wholeheartedly endorse one central idea in this book and the motivation behind 
it. Eva Jablonka and Marion J. Lamb (henceforth J&L) make it very clear that a 
multiplicity of stunning advances in biology and in evolutionary theory in the 
last several years have so completely reshaped the standard neo-Darwinian 
picture that, indeed, cognitive scientists should pay attention and re-think many 
of their ideas about the evolution of cognition. The main facts and ideas of this 
new biology are explained very well by J&L, as they are in two recent excellent 
books, also fully accessible to a lay audience (Kirschner & Gerhart 2005 and 
Carroll 2005). There is a lot to be learned in this essay about new ideas in biology 
and in modern evolutionary theory. Having said this, I wish to trace a sharp 
divide between J&L’s excellent exposition of biology and their objectionable 
picture of language evolution. Before I explain why, I need to insert one impor-
tant consideration. 
 
1. A Missing Dimension (the 5th?)  
All the ideas and experiments in biology that are detailed in this book are the 
right ones. There is not one of them that I would have liked to see left out. There 
is, however, a glaring lacuna: no mention of the powerful return of the laws of 
form in biology, of the central role that physico-chemical and computational 
factors play in the optimization of biological functions and assemblies. J&L’s 
pages dedicated to Waddington could have been the right entry into this domain, 
but they are focussed on Waddington’s interesting ideas about development and 
complex patterns of selection. Emphasis on global invariants and on the morpho-
genetic power of the laws of physics and chemistry goes back to Wentworth 
D’Arcy Thompson and Alan M. Turing (Thompson 1917/1992, Turing 1952), but 
it has come back in force in the last few years. In J&L’s tally, it should be 
conceived as the fifth dimension in evolution.  
 There is only so much that the 25,000 or so genes in the human genome can 
do to assemble a human being. Sure, as J&L explain in detail, there are multiple 
gene regulations and networks of interactions, and morphogenetic attractors, and 
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epigenetic modifications, and a complex interaction with culture. But this is far 
from being enough. Among other complex structures, tens of millions of kinds of 
antibodies have to be produced, and 1011 neurons and 1013 synapses to be 
developed and fixated, and about 60,000 miles of veins, arteries and capillaries to 
be exactly placed in each of our bodies. Christopher Cherniak has introduced the 
notion of “non-genomic nativism” and has shown by means of extensive 
computer calculations that the wiring of the cerebral cortex is the most efficient 
among, literally, billions of conceivable alternatives (see Cherniak et al. 2004, 
Cherniak 2005). The maximization of connection density in the cerebral cortex is 
even better than in the best industrial micro-chips.  
 On a different, but converging, front, West, Brown & Enquist (1997, 1999) 
have shown that the “multiples of 1/4th” power laws that govern the scaling of 
metabolic activities, membrane fluxes, heart beat, blood circulation lifetime, and 
life span, from unicellular organisms all the way up to whales, can only be 
explained by universal fractal laws. Symptomatically, they also used, years 
before J&L, in their title, the expression “4th dimension of life”, explaining that 
natural selection has exploited variations on this fractal theme to produce the 
incredible variety of biological form and function. There are genes, of course, but 
also severe geometric and physical constraints on metabolic processes. 
  A brief list of discoveries in this fast progressing sector must also include 
the work by Bejan & Marden (2006) on universal invariants of locomotion. 
Starting with general principles of physics and engineering, they have shown 
that the optimal speed and frequency of locomotion (be it walking, swimming, 
crawling, or flying), for unit of biological energy spent, scales linearly with the 
size of animals from fruit flies to whales. Other interesting applications of general 
physical principles to biological functions and structures cover optimal foraging 
in bees (Dechaume–Moncharmont et al. 2005), the neuronal regulation of singing 
in birds (Trevisan, Mindlin & Goller 2006), and the optimal character of the 
genetic code. Among thousands of possible alternatives, the genetic code as we 
know it is optimal for minimizing the effect of frame-shift mutations and minimi-
zing the energy wasted in synthesizing the start of anomalous protein sequences 
(Itzkovitz & Alon 2007). It is perhaps ungracious to reproach a lacuna to the 
authors of such a rich and diverse book, but their complete neglect of this entire 
crucial dimension of evolution (the 4th or 5th, depending on how you count them) 
deserves to be signaled and lamented. Neglect of this dimension also rever-
berates negatively onto J&L’s treatment of language and evolution. 
 
2. Symbols? Oh, No, Please!  
As of Chapter 6, I start to disagree with J&L. They follow a very old script, one 
that opens up with the appearance of symbolic systems. They duly acknowledge 
that language is special, with respect to other symbolic communication systems 
found in animals, essentially because of the subtlety of syntax. That is correct, but 
there is more to be said. Other crucial differences are to be found already at the 
level of the lexicon. It’s not just syntax that makes human language special, but 
also the nature of individual words and the way they connect with each other 
and with the world. There are at least four major differences between words and 
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all non-linguistic symbols: (A) aspectual reference, (B) headedness, (C) internal 
structure, and (D) edge features. Briefly about each one in turn: 
 
(A) Buy and sell, fear and frighten, and a huge variety of such oppositions, in all 
languages, refer to a same objective, physical, filmable, state of affairs, but 
have transparently different meanings. The same applies to nouns (de-
struction vs. demolition, gift versus theft) and to adjectives (thrifty vs. stingy, 
abundant versus excessive, and so on). Even apparently innocent words like 
city embody an aspectual component, a point of view. Words refer only 
under specific itineraries of mental access (a city can be said to be chaotic, 
polluted, expensive, mostly Victorian, each expression obviously referring 
to very different objective features; cf. Chomsky 2005). Word meanings are 
through and through intensional. No symbol used in animal communi-
cation systems has this property. Also many non-linguistic symbols used 
by humans to communicate lack it, unless they are transparently parasitic 
on language.  
(B) ‘The California highway commissioner report’ is a report. ‘The world trade 
exchange bank’ is a bank. ‘The spy who came in from the cold’ is a spy. The 
rightmost noun (in English, the leftmost in other languages) heads all 
nominal compounds. A noun with a determiner (such as the spy) heads the 
Determiner Phrase, even when the DP contains a whole sentence (who came 
in from the cold). Headedness also applies to Verb Phrases (in a more 
complicated way which need not detain us here; see below). The property 
of headedness is conserved by the syntactic derivation, from start to finish, 
and cannot be altered. It’s a crucial combinatorial valency of lexical entries, 
determining the category to which they belong and how the syntactic 
machinery must treat them. There are, of course, many ways to make a 
certain symbol particularly salient in a string of non-verbal symbols (size, 
color, etc.), but headedness is unique to words.  
(C) Words have a rich internal structure. Thematic roles are probably the most 
conspicuous such structures. There was the destruction of Carthage by Scipio, 
but there cannot be *the sleep of the bed by Scipio. Together with headedness, 
thematic roles are crucial valencies for combination into larger expressions. 
Morphological domains within words are also central, with relations of 
dominance and asymmetry. Vast, subtle, and ramified consequences of this 
internal structures ensue for syntax and semantics (Halle & Marantz 1993, 
di Sciullo 2005). No other system of non-linguistic symbols has any sem-
blance of such property.  
(D) Very simply said, words are “sticky” and so are phrasal constituents ob-
tained by merging two of them, and then merging this compound with 
other words, again and again, recursively and hierarchically. (The technical 
term for this intrinsic combinatorial power of words and phrasal constitu-
ents in the minimalist program is “edge features”; Chomsky has rightly 
stressed that the appearance of edge features has been one of the central 
events in the evolution of language.) Whole linguistic expressions, and 
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sentences in particular, are not lists of words, not even ordered lists of 
words. The point I wish to emphasize here is that words have the intrinsic 
capacity to project structure “upwards” onto larger compounds. Verbs 
offer the richest case, but not the only one. Verbs project a stratification of 
“shells” in a fixed hierarchical order, specifying the place where to insert 
the actants, the auxiliaries, the checking of tense, Case and agreement, and 
more (ever since the seminal work of Richard Larson — cf. Larson 1988).   
All in all, therefore, contrary to spontaneous intuition, contrary to the whole 
domain of semiotics, and contrary to what Chapter 6 and Chapter 9 of J&L 
suggest, there is no gain in our understanding of language by assimilating it to a 
system of symbols. Any attempt to reconstruct language evolution as the 
evolution of a symbolic system leads us badly astray. Words are, of course, in 
some sense, symbols, and they enter into the system of language, but the unique 
properties summarized here above make words stand radically apart from all 
other symbolic systems. J&L, unbeknownst to them, seal this radical separation 
in the last line of their table on p. 234, when they state that the “range of 
variation” of symbolic systems is “unlimited”. I doubt that they are right even 
about symbolic systems, but surely this does not apply to language. The range of 
variation for language is quite severely limited, as J&L sketch in Chapter 8, sort 
of noncommittally, when speaking of the “principles and parameters” model 
(Baker 2001, 2003). Symbolic systems are not relevant to language, and they 
cannot be offered as an intermediate step in language evolution. 
 
3. Culture and Language  
J&L embrace a thesis that several other authors also have tried to promote: the 
shaping of language by culture and history. Their critique of the innatist, 
modularist, and highly specific nature of language has, as is often the case with 
those who adopt their position, a possibilistic attitude: Why could we not, one 
day, explain a lot in language by means of cultural and historical factors, commu-
nicative functions, motor control, and general intelligence? This line was offered 
over 30 years ago already by Jean Piaget to Noam Chomsky, in a direct debate 
(Piattelli–Palmarini 1980). The answer is today what it was then: No one can 
exclude this possibility, as a remote possibility. It is, however, eminently rational 
to expect that it will not happen. The task seems even more hopeless today than it 
seemed 35 years ago, because we know a lot more about language than we did 
then. For instance, none of the properties of words that I have sketched above can 
be explained in terms of culture or history, or motor control, or factors of general 
intelligence. 
 On p. 218, J&L venture into a minefield, quite similar to the one into which 
Michael Arbib also ventured in BBS recently (Arbib 2005) — a parallel between 
language and mathematics:  
Although the speed and ease of learning [of language by the child] may 
indicate that there are some preexisting specifically selected neural mecha-
nisms, the same properties could also be due to a culturally evolved system 
that is well adapted to the brain, and therefore makes learning easy. For 
example, think how difficult it was 1200 years ago for someone in Europe to 
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divide one number by another. Say they wanted to divide 3712 by 116 […] 
[they point to the impracticality of the Roman numerals — MPP] Today, with our 
Arabic notation system (and the useful zero), it would take the average ten-
year-old only minutes to get the answer 32.  
No genetic change, no brain change, but rather a cultural invention that has 
become common knowledge. J&L advocate (like Arbib and Deacon and 
Tomasello) a co-evolution of brain and language and do not advocate a purely 
cultural-evolution explanation of the language capacity. Well, anyway, their 
analogy with the numerical division is totally irrelevant. No sentence in any 
language requires “minutes” to be understood by a ten-year-old, or by anyone at 
any age. Aside from the fact that ten years is a very old age for language, 
sentences are processed in fractions of seconds, not minutes, today just as they 
were 1200 years ago, or earlier. Moreover, the number system and the rules for 
dividing numbers have to be explicitly and painfully taught. No three-year-old 
child today can make that division, while he or she can well understand quite 
subtle syntactic constructions, exactly like a child could already in ancient Egypt. 
The analogy is infelicitous, because language is in a completely different ball-
park. Like this one, many analogies and thought-experiments offered by J&L in 
the domain of language are inconsequential or misleading, unlike those that deal 
with biology proper. 
 
4. New Biology and Old Reflexes  
A most puzzling aspect of this book is that, after having pleaded persuasively for 
a major expansion of concepts and models in evolutionary theory, J&L fall back 
onto a basically classic, neo-Darwinian, functionalist explanation of the evolution 
of language. Just as an example, on p. 339 we read:  
Two related sets of conditions seem to have pushed our ancestors along the 
route to language. The first was an altered ecological and social 
environment, which provided a strong and persistent motivation for better 
communication […]. The second and related set of conditions has to do with 
anatomy and physiology. […] It was probably the increased motor control 
over hand movements and vocalizations, and the ability to imitate both 
gestures and vocal sounds.  
They are in excellent and very old company in making these hypotheses, from 
Darwin himself, to Jean Piaget, Philip Liberman, Steven Pinker, Paul Bloom, 
Michael Arbib, and Derek Bickerton, just to name a few. Yet, all that we have 
learned from the new biology, and from this very book, should make any such 
functionalist hypothesis unnecessary or even suspect. Master regulatory genes 
with pleiotropic effects, transposons, gene duplications, histone modification, 
and alternative gene splicing (just to mention a few) offer manifold evolutionary 
mechanisms that make progressive functional adaptation quite marginal. But 
J&L insist, venturing into “non-genetic inheritance” to explain how “various 
features of the emerging language system that were initially culturally transmitted 
were later genetically assimilated” (p. 340, my emphasis). I have no qualm with 
non-genetic inheritance, amply attested in experiments well explained in their 
own previous chapters and also endorsed by Cherniak’s “non-genomic nativism” 
Biolinguistics    Reviews   
 
242 
(which J&L ignore — see supra), but I strongly object to the cultural transmission 
hypothesis.  
 Hauser, Chomsky & Fitch (2002) have rightly insisted on the uniqueness of 
the capacity of humans to acquire a lexicon, and on the presence in humans of 
syntactic computational powers that are conspicuously absent in other primates 
(Fitch & Hauser 2004). Together with the very special properties of words seen 
above, these are quantum changes in cognitive powers, both qualitatively and 
quantitatively, impossible to reconstruct by piecemeal functional adaptation. 
Cultural interactions among humans that are allowed by language presuppose 
them and cannot explain their gradualistic adaptive origin. The new evolutionary 
mechanisms presented in this book could have finally dispensed us from explor-
ing again an old dead-end.  
 The surprising reappearance of old, standard neo-Darwinism is also to be 
witnessed when J&L criticize the approach promoted by Hauser, Chomsky & 
Fitch in an already famous (or infamous, for some; cf. Pinker & Jackendoff 2005) 
paper published in 2002 (Hauser, Chomsky & Fitch 2002). They surprisingly 
repeat en passant the most routine neo-Darwinian objections.  
 I must also point out that in Chapter 9, J&L choose to tell us the story of the 
chimp Kanzi and the data collected by Sue Savage–Rumbaugh, allegedly 
showing important continuity between the symbolic system mastered by apes 
(after long training) and human language. They fail to even mention the case of 
the chimpanzee Nim Chimpsky which led to drastically opposite conclusions. 
After several years of daily cohabitation and of daily sessions of several hours 
trying to teach Nim American Sign Language, Laura Petitto, Herbert Terrace, and 
Thomas G. Bever concluded that no real progress had been made. This momen-
tous piece of work (Terrace et al. 1979) as well as the papers and book by David 
Premack (Premack 1972, 1986), that for many of us closed the chapter of the 
search for animal language, should at least have been presented, if only to 
criticize them.  
 
5. Language  
On the basis of previous work by Eva Jablonka and Daniel Dor, a variant of the 
co-evolution of brain and language, or rather (very importantly to J&L) language, 
brain, and culture is offered. As usual, in this kind of literature, they indulge in 
imagining various spiraling interactions between social organization, individual 
cognition, brain evolution, and language. Michael Arbib has given us his spirals, 
J&L now give us theirs. The problem, again and again, is that, if you take just any 
article at random, say, in the journal Linguistic Inquiry over the last 20 years or so, 
and look at the data, just the data (forget about the explanations), there is no 
hope whatsoever for J&L not only of explaining those data, but even of saying 
something that is remotely relevant.  
 While many interesting details are provided about experiments in biology, 
no specific data are presented in the case of language. Nowhere are we told how 
cultural transmission and the function of communication and general intelligence 
and motor control can have shaped language as we know it. On p. 305 we come 
as close to a specific hypothesis as their approach allows:   
Biolinguistics    Reviews   
 
243 
 […] Dror and other linguists have found [that] the grammatical structure of 
phrases and sentences is associated with the types of concepts the words in 
sentences embody […]. For example, the grammatical patterns we use 
depend on whether the participant in an event are active or inactive, on 
whether an action leads to a change in state of the object or it does not; on 
whether events are factual or hypothesized; on whether things are countable 
or not countable […] and so on.  
J&L then point out, correctly, that “although there are endless ways of classifying 
things, events, properties, and so on, the categories that are reflected in differ-
ences in grammatical patterns are only a small set of all those that we could use”.  
 It’s hard to disagree with this. The paucity of syntactic theta-roles, with 
respect to all the things we are interested in in our life, is one of the central 
observations in linguistics (the most insightful and influential treatment is Hale 
& Keyser 1993, 2002). Several deep explanations have been given in generative 
grammar (theta theory, X-bar theory, the semantics of count ad mass terms, event 
semantics, the theory of aspect, the theory of telicity, internal structures in lexical 
semantics, and so on, not to mention the rich theory of concepts and of concept 
acquisition by the child). 
 The rub comes next (p. 306):  
What Dror concludes from this is that language is structurally designed to 
communicate some things better than others. Its design enables it to deal 
well with messages that are grounded in a rather constrained set of catego-
ries having to do with events and situations, their time and place, and the 
participants in them, all of which are reflected in grammatical structures [my 
emphasis — MPP].  
Sorry, but it’s not so. Just to take a few signal examples, the sources of objects, the 
motivations of actions, the banality versus the exceptionality of events — all 
things we do care a lot about — are not reflected in grammatical structures. The 
endpoint of an action and the culmination of an event are routinely and subtly 
encoded in syntax, but no syntactic device exists, in any language, to encode the 
beginning of an action or the initial event. We can talk about them, of course, but 
no structure in grammar “reflects” them. Grammatical structure is only sensitive 
to actor, patient (or theme, more generally) and in some cases the instrument or 
the modality of action. Period. Bottle the wine, shelve the books, and similar verbs 
incorporate the instrument or the modality. Climb, hop, drag, attain incorporate the 
path or the telos or the modality of motion. Marginal, but admissible, con-
structions like we laughed the bad actor off the scene, John smiled the girl into his house, 
and similar ones allow to syntactically encode modality or causality. Grammar 
has no place for more than this. For everything else, we have to go paratactic (use 
adjunctions, circumlocutions, add further separate sentences, develop a whole 
discourse, and so on). Grammatical structures do not “reflect” what Dror and 
J&L want us to believe. 
 Moreover, in many cases, grammar is a hindrance to communication. There 
are things we would very much like to say, but grammar does not allow us to:   
(1) a.      * Who was it apparent yesterday that Jay saw? 
 b.      * Who do you wonder how solved the problem? 
 c.      * This is the student who I wonder what bought. 
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It would be nice to be able to communicate such simple thoughts in such simple 
ways, but grammar blocks these constructions. Many examples of how different 
languages manage to overcome these straightjackets of grammar are to be found in 
(Lightfoot 2000). 
 Another glaring case is ambiguity, a severe hindrance to communication. 
Not only grammar cannot resolve it in many cases, but sometimes forces it on us. 
It can do nothing to obviate the ambiguity of sentences like:  
(2) To who did you say we should tell the truth?  
 Is the question about the saying or about truth-telling? Grammar bars the 
quick insertion of disambiguation. We cannot say either (3a) or (3b):  
(3) a.     * To who did you say to who we should tell the truth? 
 b.     * To who did you say we should tell the truth to who?  
Many other examples are abundant in all languages. The explanation of this 
impossibility is strictly grammatical, and deep and complex (Rizzi 2004, Folli & 
Harley 2006). Grammar often clashes with our needs to communicate, and so be 
it. Communication must bow to grammar, not vice versa. Grammar does not 
“reflect” the narrow sub-set of thinkables we especially care for. It shapes a 
further sub-sub-set of these, in ways that are proprietary, letting general 
thoughts, culture, and history fend for themselves. 
 
6. Summing Up  
The prima facie appealing and almost irresistible hypothesis that the need to 
communicate has shaped the evolution of language is countered by a huge 
corpus of data collected in many languages and dialects. The deep and complex 
and detailed (and far from final) explanations advanced for these subtle facts 
about language in generative grammar (but also, competitively, advanced in 
neighboring fields such as Head-Driven Phrase Structure Grammar, Lexical 
Functional Grammar, Tree-Adjoining Grammar, and even, to some extent, 
Culicover and Jackendoff’s “Simpler Syntax”) are alien to all conjectures based 
on cultural transmission, pressures from communicability or general intelligence. 
 The wonderful developments of the new biology should have suggested 
that something else can and should be sought. This book, alas, shows that even 
accurate knowledge of the new biology is not sufficient to urge a radical re-
conceptualization of the evolution of language. J&L use their panoply of new 
evolutionary mechanisms only to try to improve the most canonical hypotheses 
about language evolution. It remains to be hoped that the readers of this fine 
exposition of the new biology will use the many eye-openers to be found in it to 
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